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Abstract
Background: Highly infectious diseases (HIDs) are defined as being transmissible from person to person, causing
life-threatening illnesses and presenting a serious public health hazard. The sampling, handling and transport of
specimens from patients with HIDs present specific bio-safety concerns.
Findings: The European Network for HID project aimed to record, in a cross-sectional study, the infection control
capabilities of referral centers for HIDs across Europe and assesses the level of achievement to previously published
guidelines. In this paper, we report the current diagnostic capabilities and bio-safety measures applied to diagnostic
procedures in these referral centers. Overall, 48 isolation facilities in 16 European countries were evaluated.
Although 81% of these referral centers are located near a biosafety level 3 laboratory, 11% and 31% of them still
performed their microbiological and routine diagnostic analyses, respectively, without bio-safety measures.
Conclusions: The discrepancies among the referral centers surveyed between the level of practices and the
European Network of Infectious Diseases (EUNID) recommendations have multiple reasons of which the interest of
the individuals in charge and the investment they put in preparedness to emerging outbreaks. Despite the fact that
the less prepared centers can improve by just updating their practice and policies any support to help them to
achieve an acceptable level of biosecurity is welcome.
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Findings
Background
A highly infectious disease (HID), such as severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) [1], Lassa fever [2], or
other hemorrhagic fever [3,4], is defined as transmissible
from person to person, causes a life-threatening illness,
presents a serious hazard in healthcare settings and in
the community and requires specific control measures
[5]. Suspected HID patients should be managed in spe-
cialized isolation facilities, such as “high-level isolation
units” [5].
To prepare the hospital management of HIDs for pos-
sible future outbreaks, the European Union (EU) re-
cently funded the European Network of Infectious
Diseases (EUNID) [5]. Following EUNID, the European
Network for Highly Infectious Diseases (EuroNHID), a
new EU-funded project, performed a cross-sectional
study analysis of European isolation facilities. The spe-
cific mission of EuroNHID is to prepare and support iso-
lation facilities to provide appropriate infection control
measures and strategies for health care worker (HCW)
safety during care to patients with suspected and con-
firmed HIDs.
The appropriate management of HID cases requires
high-level diagnostic capabilities.
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recommended biosafety procedures for the entire diag-
nostic process, from specimen sampling to the transport
of laboratories [6]. The aim of this paper is to report the
current inventory of the diagnostic capabilities and in-
fection control procedures for the appropriate and safe
handling of specimens in 48 isolation facilities in 16
European countries who participated to the cross-
sectional study of the EuroNHID.
Methods
Settings and participants
At the beginning of the project, national health autho-
rities in all of the European countries were asked to sug-
gest a physician with expertise in HID management as a
project partner and to identify all the isolation facilities
as referral centers for HID in his country. To survey
only isolation facilities identified by national health au-
thorities for the referral and management of HIDs, we
requested official documents in which these hospitals
are clearly indicated.
Data collection
The data were collected during on-site visits using
checklists specifically developed during the first year of
the project [7]. The checklists were drafted by the stee-
ring committee members (including partners from
France, Germany, Greece and the United-Kingdom) and
then discussed with and approved by all of the partners.
The coordination team (based at the National Institute
for Infectious Diseases in Rome, Italy) considered the
strength scores of these assessments to be indispensable.
On-site visits were performed by the project coordi-
nator assisted, when feasible, by the project partner of
the explored country from February-November 2009.
Objectives and data analysis
The objective of the project was to assess the level of
achievement of each surveyed facility to previously pub-
lished guidelines [5,6]. With this aim, a standard evalua-
tion form was developed. In this form, all of the
data were summarized in main topics, and for each
topic, an evaluation score was assigned that represented
Table 1 Diagnostic capabilities, appropriate location and procedures for microbiological and routine tests in 48
referral center for HID in 16 European countries
Diagnostic capabilities Evaluation score*
A Fully/mostly B Partially C Not
Achieved achieved Achieved
N (%) N (%) N (%)
Topic 1: The isolation facility has access to BSL-4 labs or capabilities/protocols
for the safe and appropriate handling of group 4 agent specimens for diagnosis
11/48 (23) 30/48 (62) 7/48 (15)
Topic 2: The isolation facility has access to BSL-3 labs or capabilities/protocols
for the safe and appropriate handling of group 3 agent specimens for diagnosis
39/48 (81) 9/48 (19) 0/48
Topic 3: The isolation facility has capabilities/procedures for the safe and appropriate
management of other tests/routine analysis in HID patients (i.e., use of bed-side tests
inside isolation area or use of central hospital lab after inactivation of samples or
without inactivation but with appropriate measures of biosecurity and biosafety,
including the use of automatic, closed-type system analyzers)
16/48 (33) 19/48 (40) 13/48 (27)
Appropriate location and procedures for microbiological or routine tests microbiological test routine test
N (%) N (%)
Inside the isolation area (same room or other room) 8/47 (17) 13/48 (27)
In the BSL-3 reference lab 32/47 (68) 15/48 (31)
In the general lab, with closed-type automatized analyzers 19/47 (40) 26/48 (54)
In the general lab, without closed-type automatized analyzers 5/47 (11) 15/48 (31)
*The corresponding assessment of the evaluation scores of the three topics are summarized below:
Topic 1: management of group 4 agent specimens (A: The unit is located in the same hospital/city as a BSL-4 lab and has protocols for the safe and
appropriate handling of group 4 agent specimens; B: The unit is not located in the same hospital/city as a BSL-4 lab but has protocols for the safe and
appropriate handling of group 4 agent specimens to another city/country; C: The unit is not located in the same hospital/city as a BSL-4 lab and does not
have adequate protocols for the safe and appropriate handling of group 4 agent specimens to another city/country). Topic 2: management of group 3
agent specimens (A: The unit is located in the same hospital/city as a BSL-3 lab and has adequate protocols for the safe and appropriate handling of group 3
agent specimens; B: The unit is not located in the same hospital/city as a BSL-3 lab but has adequate protocols for the safe and appropriate handling of
group 3 agent specimens to another city; C: The unit is not located in the same hospital/city as a BSL-3 lab and does not have adequate protocols for the safe
and appropriate handling of group 3 agent specimens to another city). Topic 3: management of other tests/routine analysis (A: Optimal use of bed-side
testing inside the isolation area OR use of the central hospital lab after inactivation of samples OR use of the BSL-3 lab; B: Use of the central hospital lab without
inactivation with special measures of biosecurity and biosafety, including the use of automatic, closed-type system analyzers; C: Use of central hospital lab
without special measures of biosecurity and biosafety).
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based on the available evidence, literature data and expert
consensus [5,6].
The checklists and the evaluation form are available
on the website www.eunid.eu after free registration.
Results
The participant selection process led to the inclusion of
48 isolation facilities identified for the referral and ma-
nagement of HIDs in 16 countries Table 1.
Throughout Europe, 26 (54%) of the surveyed isolation
facilities have a biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) laboratory (lab)
[8] in their country, 11 of which are located in the same
hospital or city as the isolation facility to avoid or limit
the distance of the transportation of HID diagnostic spe-
cimens. Among those isolation facilities not located in
the same city as the BSL-4 lab, 30 (62%) have written
protocols for the appropriate handling and transporta-
tion of the specimens to a BSL-4 lab, and 7 (15%) have
no specific protocols.
Among the isolation facilities surveyed, 48 (100%) and
47 (98%) have a BSL-3 lab [8] for virological and bac-
teriological diagnosis in their country, respectively. In
total, 39 (81%) of the isolation facilities are located in
the same hospital or city as the BSL-3 lab, and all of the
isolation facilities have an adequate protocol for the safe
and appropriate handling of group 3 agents.
Sixteen (33%) isolation facilities have access to adequate
capabilities for other routine diagnostic tests: (i) optimal
u s eo fb e d - s i d et e s t i n gi n s i d ethe isolation area, (ii) use
of the central hospital lab after the inactivation of sam-
p l e s ,a n d( i i i )u s eo ft h eB S L - 3l a b[ 6 ] .H o w e v e r ,1 9
(40%) of the isolation facilities perform routine ana-
lysis (such as biochemistry and hematology) in the
central hospital lab without inactivation but using spe-
cial measures of biosecurity and biosafety, such as
closed-type auto-analyzers. The remaining 13 (27%) faci-
lities perform other diagnostic tests in the central labora-
tory without any special measures of biosecurity and
biosafety.
Microbiological and routine diagnostic tests are per-
formed directly inside the isolation area in 8 (17%) and
13 (27%) of the surveyed facilities, respectively. Micro-
biological testing in the majority (32; 68%) of isolation
facilities and routine testing in a small proportion (15;
31%) of the facilities are carried out in a BSL-3 lab. For
19 (40%) and 26 (54%) of the centers, the samples of
microbiological and routine testing are sent to the cen-
tral laboratory, which performs the analysis in a closed-
type automatic analyzer. Finally, microbiological and
routine tests are performed in the central laboratory
without using closed-type auto-analyzers in 5 (11%) and
15 (31%) of the surveyed facilities, respectively.
Conclusion
Although most of the isolation facilities surveyed have
appropriate diagnostic capabilities and infection control
procedures for the safe handling of specimens, 31% and
11% performed their routine and microbiological diag-
nostic tests in the central laboratory without any mea-
sures of biosecurity and biosafety as recommended by
the EUNID [6]. The delay between data collection, and
publication, can be considered as one of the limit of this
paper.
The discrepancies among the referral centers surveyed
between the level of practices and the EUNID recom-
mendations have multiple reasons. One main expla-
nation is the interest of the individuals in charge and the
investment they put in preparedness to emerging out-
breaks. Obviously, these centers might benefit from lar-
ger funding from their national institution, or if they
better allocated their internal resources. Despite the fact
that the less prepared centers can improve by just upda-
ting their practice and policies any support to help them
to achieve an acceptable level of biosecurity is welcome.
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